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Exporting Ethics: Lessons From Russia's
Attempt to Regulate Federal Lobbying
By JASON D. KAUNE
The Russian Federation remains in troubled political and economic
transition.! In the "spirit of the Marshall Plan," the United States has as-
sisted its former Cold War foe to cope with the unpredictable course of
change.2 While providing technical advice, U.S. experts have influenced
Russian legislation defining the legal relationship between the country's
nascent business community and fledgling federal government.' This
Note analyzes the attempt to export the U.S. model of business-
government ethics through a Russian federal law regulating lobbying.
The failure of that 1995 endeavor provides lessons for both Russian and
U.S. policymakers.
The specter of corruption looms large in both Russia and the United
States. In Russia, the trenchant bureaucracy, dishonest legislators, and
organized crime threaten democratic and free-market reforms.! In the
* Concurrent student in law and public policy, University of California, Hastings
and the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. B.A. Yale Col-
lege, 1990.
1. The Makings of a Molotov Cocktail, ECONOMIST, July 12, 1997, at S4.
2. Bill Clinton, The Lessons of the Marshall Plan, 63 VrrAL SPEECHES 546-48
(1997). Unlike the Marshall Plan, under which President Harry Truman and a conserva-
tive U.S. Congress funded post-World War II reconstruction of European democracies,
current fiscal constraints have meant that economic assistance to the Russian Federation
has been more advisory than monetary. See John C. Roberts, A Marshall Plan of Ideas,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCEMONrrOR, April 13, 1990, at 19.
3. James H. Andrews, Helping Law Come In From the Cold, CHusFIAN ScIENCE
MoNrrOR, March 21, 1994, at 15; see, e.g. Andrei Baev, The Transformation of the Role
of the State in Monitoring Large Firms in Russia: From the State's Supervision to the
State's Fiduciary Duties, 8 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 247 (1995) (industrial privatization);
Shoshanah V. Asnis, Controlling the Russian Mafia: Russian Legal Confusion and U.S.
Jurisdictional Power-Play, 11 Conn. J. Int'l L. 299 (1996) (crime prevention); Laura A.
Wakefield, The Need for Comprehensive Legislation in the Russian Oil and Gas Indus-
tries, 29 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 149 (1997) (energy); William D. Meyer, Facing the
Post-Communist Reality: Lawyers in Private Practice in Central and Eastern Europe
and the Republics of the Former Soviet Union, 26 LAw & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1019 (1995)
(legal profession).
4. Scott P. Boylan, Organized Crime and Corruption in Russia: Implications for
U.S. and International Law, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J 1999, 1999-2002 (1996); Carol J.
Williams, Russia Ruffled by Revelry in Parliament, L.A. TwIEs, Sept. 11, 1996, at Al.
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United States, the influence of foreign lobbyists, the size of corporate
political contributions, and the prevalence of corrupt business practices
abroad have raised concerns about improprieties in the business-
government relationship.5 Despite the popular perception of corruption
at home, the United States has promoted domestic anticorruption laws as
models for regulation abroad.
Lobbying reveals an ethical dilemma of democratic capitalism. On
one hand, lobbying public officials is an outgrowth of the give-and-take
between diverse factions.6 On the other hand, lobbying exposes the con-
flict between the narrow economic goals of organized interests and the
disinterested public good.7 In the United States, ethical boundaries to le-
gitimate corporate lobbying have developed in reaction to scandals and
8excesses of the times. In Russia, the sudden transition to a market
economy has dissolved ethical boundaries to the relationship between
business interests and public officials. 9
This Note explores the implications of exporting U.S. lobbying laws
to the Russian Federation. Section I reviews the business-government
relationship in the United States, legal limitations to lobbying public of-
ficials, alternative models of regulation, and international promotion of
anticorruption laws. Section II describes the business-government rela-
tionship in Russia, current legal limitations on lobbying Russian offi-
cials, alternative models of regulation, and various approaches of ex-
porting the U.S. model of regulation to the Russian Federation. Section
I discusses a law proposed in the Russian legislature to regulate lobby-
ing and assesses reasons for its failure. Section IV presents options for
future courses of action and concludes that both Russians and Americans
could benefit from an improved dialogue on the regulation of lobbying.
5. Gil Troy, Money and Politics: The Oldest Connection, WILSON Q. 14, 30-32
(Summer 1997); Inside the Belly of the Beast, ECONOMIST, July 26, 1997, at 23.
6. Lobbying, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, (Donald Bacon,
Roger Davidson, Morton Keller, eds., 1994); THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (Jamcs Madison).
7. Id.
8. See Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet?: An Answer
From Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 57, 58-61 (1996).
9. Suzanne Possehl, New Crime and Punishment, 82 A.B.A.J. 72, 72 (1996)("In the
giddy transition to a market economy, ethical boundaries have dissolved.... [Russians]
must now learn business ethics and fair play.").
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I. Lobbying in the United States
From the first meeting of the First Continental Congress in 1787,
business interests have retained lobbyists to influence legislation.10 To-
day, close to 14,000 professional lobbyists advocate the agendas of their
employers to members of Congress and high ranking executive branch
officials." The largest group of lobbyists comes from the business
community.1 2 This section reviews the adversarial relationship between
the public and private sectors in the United States, legal limitations to
lobbying by business interests, alternatives for regulating lobbying, and
the U.S. effort to reach across its borders to promote business-
government ethics abroad.
A. The Business-Government Relationship
The roots of the modem business-government relationship in the
United States trace back to the Gilded Age. Mark Twain memorialized
this period at the turn of the twentieth century as characterized by expan-
sion, corruption, ruthless speculators, and crooked politicians taking ad-
vantage of the uncertainty of massive economic change.13 In an era of
limited government, the business community grew in political and eco-
nomic influence. 14 In response, government regulation of business ac-
tivity expanded, first during the Progressive Era and later through the
New Deal. 15 The business-government relationship became adversarial,
framed as a continuing contest between public and private interests.
1 6
10. JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM, THE LOBBYISTS: How INFLUENCE PEDDLERS WORK THEIR
WAY IN WASHINGTON 8 (1992); Lobbying, supra note 6.
11. Peter H. Stone, Lobbyists on a Leash?, NAT'L J., Feb. 3. 1996, at 242. Unclear
lobbying registration requirements have hindered attempts to estimate the actual number
of practicing lobbyists: "estimates have ranged from a few thousand to almost 100,000."
Id.
12. Id.
13. See generally MARK TWAIN, THE GILDED AGE: A TALE OF TODAY (Penguin 1985)
(1873).
14. Thomas K. McCraw, Business and Government: the Origins of the Adversary
Relationship, 26 CAL. MGrr. REV. 33, 33-50 (1984); Troy, supra note 5, at 21.
15. McCraw, supra note 14, at 33-50; Troy, supra note 5, at 21-26.
16. McCraw, supra note 14, at 33-50; Troy, supra note 5, at 23 ("Government and
Big Business came to be seen as adversaries, and the corrupting effect of money in poli-
tics was... regarded not as aberration, but epidemic.").
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By mid-century, professional lobbyism was firmly entrenched in
Washington, D.C.17 Congress worried that lobbyists, wielding mislead-
ing "propaganda," led corporate clients to believe that they exerted a
"mysterious influence" on the legislative process.' 8 Nonetheless, Con-
gress recognized legitimate lobbyists as:
entirely honest and respectable representatives of business, profes-
sional, and philanthropic organizations who come to Washington
openly and frankly to express their views for or against legislation,
many of whom serve a useful and perfectly legitimate purpose in ex-
pressing the views and interpretations of their employers with respect
to legislation that concerns them.19
By the 1960s and 1970s, businesses joined labor and environmental
groups in effectively organizing at the grassroots level, lobbied Congress
through powerful trade associations, adopted detailed legislative agen-
das, and hired government affairs professionals to directly influence
government action.20 Improper contacts with lobbyists became part of
the Watergate scandal, resulted in the reprimand and imprisonment of
members of Congress, and prompted legislative reform.21 Business in-
terests persisted in playing a decisive role in policy debates during the
1980s and 1990s.22 Today, corporate lobbyists have "so suffused" the
federal legislative process "that at times they seem to be part of the gov-
ernment itself." 3
Just as government responded to unbridled capitalism in the early
part of this century, Congressional leaders have vowed to address the
political power of business interests in the last decade of tre century. 24
17. BIRNBAUM, supra note 10, at 12.
18. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 621 n.10 (citing legislative history).
19. Id.
20. BIRNBAUM, supra note 10, at 16; DAvID VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES: THE
POLMCAL POWER OF BusiNEss IN AMERICA 194-213 (1989).
21. Birnbaum, supra note 10, at 16; Troy, supra note 5, at 27.
22. Id. at xi-xv (budget deficit); BOB WOODWARD, THE AGENDA 188-281 (1993)
(health care); DAvD C. KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONs RULE Tr WORLD 145 (1996)
(trade).
23. BIRNBAUM, supra note 10, at 3.
24. Investigation into Campaign Financing During the 1996 Elections: Hearing
Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 105th Cong., lsi: Sess. (July 8,
1997) (Statements of Senators Fred Thompson and John Glenn) available in 1997 WL
373861.
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Although it would be a mistake to characterize the diverse and conflict-
ing interests of the business community as either monolithic or ideologi-
cally one-sided, relations between the public and private sectors remain
adversarial.2 In the middle of this contentious relationship exists the
lobbyist.
B. Limitations to Legitimate Lobbying
The first way in which American law has limited lobbying by busi-
ness interests is through the criminal prohibition against bribery of pub-
lic officials. Simply stated, a lobbyist may not corruptly offer anything
of value with intent to influence an official act by a public official 2b
The Supreme Court emphasized in Buckley v. Valeo that bribery laws
deal "with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with
money to influence governmental action."' 7 In McCormick v. United
States, the Court refused to find either bribery or extortion when a state
legislator solicited and accepted cash from a lobbyist representing an or-
ganization which benefited from a bill supported by that legislator:2
To hold otherwise would open to prosecution not only conduct that has
long been thought to be well within the law but also conduct that in a
very real sense is unavoidable as long as election campaigns are fi-
nanced by private contributions or expenditures, as they have been
from the beginning of the Nation.2
In other words, the democratic experience in the United States accepts
that use of private funds to gain access to public decision-making does
not, without corrupt intent, constitute bribery.O
25. Mary Beth Regan, Campaign Finance PACs Cross the Street, Bus. WK, Apr. 10,
1995, at 10.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994). Section 201 also addresses illegal gratuities. The
difference between illegal gratuities and bribery is the absence of corrupt intent. 18
U.S.C. § 201(c); see generally Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Inter-
mediate Theory of Politics, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 784 (1985).
27. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976).
28. See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991) (reversing a conviction
for extorting property under color of right in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1951).
29. Id. at 272.
30. "We do not think that the desire to gain access, by itself, amounts to an intent to
improperly influence the legislators' exercise of official duties." See United States v.
Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 731 (1st Cir. 1996). Cf. United States v. Carpenter, 961 F.2d 834,
1997]
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A second way Congress has acted to curb the influence of business
groups and their agents is through campaign finance reform. In 1976
Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA"), which
outlawed corporations and labor unions from making contributions or
expenditures in connection with federal elections.3 1 Instead, the act al-
lowed the creation of political action committees which must register
with and report to the Federal Election Commission ("FEC"). 2 Finding
that restrictions on political contributions and expenditures implicate
First Amendment rights of free speech and association, the Supreme
Court held in Buckley that campaign finance limits are subject to strict
scrutiny. 33 The prevention of corruption or the appearance thereof be-
came the only compelling government interest that could justify such
limits.34 Relying on a similar rationale, courts have struck clown statutes
outlawing all political contributions to legislators by lobbyists. 35 Today,
business lobbyists routinely contribute to campaign coffer,3 in order to
827 (9th Cir. 1992) ("We recognize, however, that granting or denying a:cess [to lobby-
ists] based on contributions may occur in such a context that it sends a clear and unambi-
guous message that a legislator is conditioning his support for legislatiorn on [the] levels
of contributions. Under such circumstances, a jury could find that a legislator was con-
ditioning his support for legislation on the receipt of contributions.")
31. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a).
32. 2 U.S.C. §§ 432-34.
33. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45.
34. Id. at 26-29; Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1984). See also Note, Parties, PACs, and Campaign Fi-
nance: Preserving First Amendment Parity, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1574-1576 (1997).
35. See Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Superior Ct., 25 Cal. 3d 33, 45 (1979).
However, under an initiative effective on January 1, 1997, California law prohibits any
elected officeholder from accepting campaign contributions made by lobbyists "if that
lobbyist finances, engages, or is authorized to engage in lobbying thc. governmental
agency for which the candidate is seeking election or the government agency of the of-
ficeholder." Cal. Gov. Code § 85704. At least thirteen states currently limit the timing
of political contributions from lobbyists, usually through a prohibited period encom-
passing the legislative session. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1234.01 (1974); Colo. R.S.A. §
1-45-117 (1974); Iowa Code § 56.15A (1975); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 46-265 (1974); La. Stat.
§ 24:53 (1972); Mass. G. L. § 55.18 (1975); Minn. Stat. 211B.15(2) (1988); Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 218.942 (1975); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 2-11-8.1 (1978); N.C. Gen. StEt. 163-278.13A
(1991); Or. Rev. Stat. § 260.725 (1993); Tenn. Code Ann. 3-6-106 (1995); Wis. Stat.
13.625 (1977). c.f. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 6.811(b) (1993) (legislative lobbyist; may not make
campaign contributions to legislators, candidates for the legislature or their campaign
committees); M.D. State Gov't Art. § 15-707(d)(1) (1995) (no contributions in calendar
year during which lobbyist lobbied).
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gain access to public officials. 36 In other words, while the essence of the
lobbyist's job is to convince, not contribute, many lobbyists perceive that
they must pay to play an effective role in the policymaking process.
Congress has acted in a third way to reduce corruption in the busi-
ness-government relationship. Ethics rules administered by the executive
and legislative branch require government employees to disclose fi-
nances, restrict gifts and honoraria to members of Congress, and prohibit
lobbying by senior officials of the executive branch for a period of five
years.37 In the last decade, the application of Congressional ethics rules
toppled one Speaker of the House of Representatives and led to formal
action by the Ethics Committee against another. 3s In terms of corporate
lobbying, new conflict of interest laws slowed the "revolving door" phe-
nomenon by spelling out the circumstances under which a former public
official may become a paid lobbyist.39 In summary, ethics rules have in-
creasingly addressed corruption in the business-government relationship
through preventative measures.
Finally, while campaign finance, bribery and ethics laws draw
boundaries outside which legitimate lobbying may not operate, public
disclosure laws expose corruption within these limits. Until January of
1996, the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946 ("FRLA") and the
Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 ("FARA") governed lobbying
of members of Congress.40 Finding these statutes ineffective and un-
clear, Congress enacted the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 ("LDA")
in order to increase awareness of paid lobbying and confidence in gov-
36. Regan, supra note 25, at 10. The practice also holds true for the Executive
Branch. William C. Rampel & Alan C. Miller, First Lady's Aide Solicited Check to
DNC, Donor Says, L.A. TNEs, July 27, 1997, at Al.
37. Clark, supra note 8, at 65-66.
38. Mary McGrory, The House's Civil Obedience, WASH. PosT, Jan. 26, 1997, at Cl.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 207; Exec. Order No. 12,834,58 Fed. Reg. 5911-16 (Jan. 20, 1993).
40. The FRLA covered direct communications by individuals and organizations
whose principle purpose was to influence the passage or defeat of legislation by Con-
gress. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 623 (1954) (establishing the test for
coverage under the FRLA). FARA required lobbyists representing foreign corporations
to register with the Justice Department. See Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 237-
43 (1943) (narrowly interpreting disclosure requirements for lobbyists acting on behalf
of foreign agents). See generally THOMAS M. SUSMAN, THE LOBBYiNG MANuAL 13-14
(1993) (describing limited extent of actual lobbying disclosure and paucity of indict-
ments by the Department of Justice following the Harriss decision).
1997]
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ernment integrity.'" Under the LDA, businesses and their lobbyists
which meet certain qualification thresholds must register and file semi-
annual reports with the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House.
42
The LDA requires disclosure of federal bodies contacted, issues lobbied
upon, and a good faith estimate of total expenses incurred. 43 The LDA
does not cover participation in public hearings or requests, for informa-
tion from federal officials delivered without attempting to influence their
decisions.44 Knowing violation of the LDA can result in civil and crimi-
nal penalties.45 In short, the LDA was the latest in a long series of leg-
islative attempts to shed light on legitimate lobbying in the executive and
legislative branches.
C. Alternatives for Regulating Lobbying
Frustrated by First Amendment constraints on anticorruption laws,
advocates of cleaner government have called for alternative approaches
to regulating the business-government relationship. The narrow applica-
tion of bribery laws is said to ignore "the historic American abhorrence
for legislative decision-making based on the profit motive.'"46 Dissenting
judicial voices have urged a more equitable "balance between the access
of the individual citizen and the access of the lobbyist to public repre-
sentatives." 47 Candidates for national office have lampooned lobbyists
41. 2 U.S.C. § 1601 (finding "existing lobbying disclosure statutes have been inef-
fective because of unclear statutory language, weak administrative and enforcement pro-
visions, and an absence of clear guidance as to who is required to register and what they
are required to disclose[.] ... [Efffective public disclosure.., will inelease public con-
fidence in the integrity of government).
42. A corporation must file federal lobbying reports if, within a six month period, an
employee makes one or more lobbying contact, spends at least 20 percent of his or her
time on lobbying, and the corporation expends more than $20,000 on lobbying. 2 U.S.C.
§§ 1602(10), (14) and 1603(a)(3)(A)(ii).
43. 2 U.S.C. § 1604(c) (requiring semiannual reports and specifying content).
44. 2 U.S.C. § 1602(8). "Lobbying activities" include preparaticn, planning, re-
search and other background work intended for use in lobbying contracts." 22 U.S.C. §
1602(7).
45. 2 U.S.C. § 1606 (civil penalty of up to $50,000 for failure to comply with the
LDA); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (maximum five-year prison sentence for perjury).
46. Joseph R. Weeks, Bribes, Gratuities and the Congress: The Institutionalized
Corruption of the Political Process, the Impotence of Criminal Law to Reach it and a
Proposal for Change, 13 J. LEGIS. 124, 131 (1986).
47. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 25 Cal. 3d at 62 (Bird, C.J. dissenting).
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wearing "alligator shoes" and "$1,000 tailor-made suits" who rewrite
laws behind closed doors and "have money to spend" on behalf of spe-
cial interest clients.48 On one level, critics argue that the more "sunlight"
cast on the activities of lobbyists, the better.49 On another level, advo-
cates of a more balanced view of the First Amendment have suggested
that additional restrictions on business lobbying and contributions might
level the economic playing field or purify the legislative process.5 The
First Amendment, these critics conclude, must be weighed against the
state interest in deterring corruption.
In contrast, other commentators have argued that adding more anti-
corruption laws could be counterproductive. New regulations on legisla-
tive and lobbying ethics invariably lead to new loopholes, unintended
consequences, and more business for firms advising attorneys and advo-
cates. 51 Assailing current regulations on legislative ethics as "a patch-
work of ad hoc responses to political scandals," one academic has pro-
posed the use of fiduciary principles to evaluate whether an official has
violated the public trust.52 Another observer, pointing to the social bene-
fits of constituent service, has warned that new ethics restrictions
"should be evaluated not only in terms of the corruption they would sup-
press, but also in terms of the legitimate activity they would incidentally
48. Clinton's Presentation Likened to Perot Style (CNN television broadcast, Feb.
16, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News & Analysis File.
49. Seth F. Kramer, Sunshine, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters. The Tension Between
Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1991) ("In
general, scholarly analysis of the First Amendment disposes us toward the proposition
that more information is better. We esteem 'sunlight' because it illuminates.") (quoting
Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERs USE IT 92 (1914));
DENNIS F. THOMPSON, PoLrrIcAL ETHIcS AND PUBUC OFFICE 116-122 (1987) ("Whatever
institutional devices we devise, they should provide not simply more information but
more information of significance about the decisions legislators make and the conditions
under which they make them.").
50. Francis Foster, Information and the Problem of Democracy. The Russian Expe-
rience, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 243 (1996) (questioning whether free speech threatens de-
mocracy by deepening social tensions and leading to control by the wealthy and power-
ful); Ronald K.L. Collins and David M. Skover, NATION, July 21, 1997 at 12 (arguing for
equality over laissez-fair values when applying the First Amendment).
51. Stone, supra note 11, at 242; Troy, supra note 5, at 32.
52. Clark, supra note 8, at 77-79.
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prevent." 53 The concern from this perspective is that tighter ethics rules
may hinder the free exchange of ideas.w
The Supreme Court has long participated in this debate. In United
States v. Harriss, the Court upheld registration and reporting of lobbying
activity against challenges that disclosure impinged on the freedom to
associate and petition the government under the First Amendment.
55
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren justified disclosure as a
method by which Congress and voters could monitor powerful special
interests:
Present-day legislative complexities are such that individual members
of Congress cannot be expected to explore the myriad p;'essures to
which they are regularly subjected. Yet full realization of the Ameri-
can ideal of government by elected representatives depends :o no small
extent on their ability to properly evaluate such pressures. Otherwise
the voice of the people may all too easily be drowned out by the voice
of special interest groups seeking favored treatment while masquerad-
ing as proponents of the public weal. 56
In his dissent, Justice Jackson countered that while lobbyists' "con-
flicting claims and propaganda are confusing, annoying and at times, no
doubt, deceiving and corrupting" legislation should not risk encumbering
"the greatest freedom of access to Congress, so that the people may press
for their selfish interest, with Congress acting as arbiter of their demands
and conflicts. 57 The Court later declared in First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti that the "inherent worth of speech in terms of its ca-
pacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its
source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual."5 In his
dissent, Justice White argued that Congress could act to address the
53. Ronald M. Levin, Congressional Ethics and Constituent Advocacy in an Age of
Mistrust, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1, 33 (1996).
54. Floyd Abrams, NATION, July 21, 1997 at 12-13 (criticizing proposals to limit
speech of big business and wealthy individuals).
55. See Harriss, 347 U.S. at 625-626 (1954) (finding that Congress had a valid inter-
est in determining the source of voices seeking to influence legislation and could require
professional lobbyists to identify themselves and disclose lobbying activities).
56. Id. at 625.
57. Id. at 635.
58. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (invalidating
state statute banning corporate contributions to a statewide initiative).
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"deleterious influences" of political involvement by corporations and
"those who exercise control over large aggregations of capital."59 Alter-
native approaches to combating the deleterious influences of corruption
in the U.S. business-government relationship must therefore preserve the
right to petition public officials without curtailing the First Amendment
rights of the corporate petitioner.60
D. Reaching Beyond U.S. Borders
The United States has reached across its borders to export domestic
views of business ethics to other countries. In enacting the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act61 ("FCPA"), U.S. lawmakers rejected the prevalence
of bribery as a way of doing business in the international marketplace.
62
The FCPA "represented Congress' determination that competition in
overseas markets should be based on the merits" and that, in the words of
William Shakespeare, "corruption wins not more than honesty." 63 By
regulating the behavior of business interests abroad, Congress made cor-
ruption into a multilateral issue.64 By urging other countries to follow
59. Id. at 811 (White, J. dissenting) (quoting United States v. Automobile Workers,
352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957)).
60. Even disclosure requirements may fail under First Amendment scrutiny when
they are so onerous as to unnecessarily curtail a lobbyist's right to petition. Fair Political
Practices Comm'n, 25 Cal. 3d at 48 (striking down a requirement that lobbyists report
transactions with businesses in which a lobbied legislator has a financial interest as
overly burdensome). However, increasingly extensive disclosure of the lobbyist expen-
ditures and activities of have been mandated by state legislatures and upheld by the
courts. See e.g. Florida League of Prof'l Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 460
(11th Cir. 1996); Minnesota State Ethical Practices v. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n, 761 F.2d 509,
512 (8th Cir. 1985).
61. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(m)(b), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1977), amended by Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act Amendment of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 5001-5003, 102 Stat.
1107, 1415-25 (1988).
62. Agnieszka Klich, Bribery in Economics in Transition: The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 32 STAN. J. INT'LL. 121, 122 (1996).
63. Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Private
Right of Action, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 185, 187 (1994) (quoting a speech by Assistant Attor-
ney General Philip Heynann, quoting WmnAM SHAmEPEARE, KING HENRY THE EiGHTH
act 3, sc. 2).
64. Klich, supra note 62, at 122.
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the American example, the United States has supported a worldwide
campaign to deter corrupt business practices.6
As a vehicle for exporting anticorruption laws, the FCPA illustrates
the tension between the right to petition the government and the need to
combat corruption. Congress created a two-pronged approach to FCPA
enforcement by requiring disclosure and imposing prohibitions.6 First,
the act mandates detailed record keeping and reporting of funds ex-
pended overseas. 67 Second, the act forbids U.S. businesses and their
agents from paying public officials to abuse their positions, with civil
and criminal fines ranging from $10,000 to $2 million.68
Business interests have faulted the FCPA on several grounds, each
of which resemble problems associated with domestic anticorruption
statutes. First, the law addresses only the most blatant abuses and, given
the difficulties inherent in transnational cases, the statute is rarely en-
forced.9 Second, differing ethical norms and business practices in other
countries complicate application of the elements of the offense.70 Third,
U.S corporations have complained that the FCPA imposes moral princi-
ples without regard to financial loss and the competitive disadvantage
suffered by law abiding U.S. dealmakers.7 1 In the context of Russia and
other transitional economies, practitioners have faulted the FCPA as
"filled with ambiguities in both law and commercial realitie'.' 2
Defenders of the FCPA have vigorously responded and promoted
the law as an aspirational model for other countries. First, allowing a
private right of action under the FCPA could breathe new life into the
law.73 Second, 1988 amendments to the FCPA allow for facilitating
65. G. Pascal Zachary, Anticorruption Drive Starts to Show Results, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 27, 1997, at Al.
66. Pines, supra note 63, at 188.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78m.
68. Id. at 191.
69. Id. at 192-195.
70. Id. at 197-198. For example, firms doing business in former state-run economies
commonly rely on local agents who had once been employees of state agencies but who
no longer fall under the definition of public officials. Id.
71. Pines, supra note 65, at 204-210.
72. Christopher F. Dugan & Vladimir Lechtman, The FCPA in Rvssia and Other
Former Communist Countries, 91 AM. J. INT'LL. 378, 388 (1997).
73. Pines, supra note 63, at 216.
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payments to expedite "routine government action ' 4, as opposed to cor-
rupt payments intended to induce public officials to misuse their posi-
tions to wrongfully direct business. 5 For example, an American com-
pany promoting goods or services in Russia probably does not violate the
FCPA when it invites officials to visit facilities in the United States, as
long as any payments were "reasonable and bona fide" expenses for
promoting business or executing a contract.76 Third, further fine-tuning
of the definitions for "corrupt" and "official" action could help the law
fit the reality of doing business in transitional economies. 7  Although
unilateral anticorruption laws may disadvantage U.S. companies, reduc-
tion of the marginal costs of bribery has improved the business climate
for all foreign investors.78
With this debate in the background, the United States has encour-
aged a worldwide anticorruption campaign. The Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development ("OECD"), recommended that
members adopt criminal, civil, tax, banking and licensing regulations and
cooperate-operate with non-member countries and international organi-
zations to promote anticorruption policies. 79 Rules of Conduct issued by
the International Chamber of Commerce called on governments to enact
lobbyist disclosure and campaign finance laws. 0 In 1996, members of
the Organization of American States ("OAS") signed an anticorruption
agreement following the OECD example." In 1997, the United States
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b) & 78dd-2(b).
75. Klich, supra note 62, at 124-125.
76. 15 U.S.C. 78dd-l(c)(2) & 78dd-2(c)(2); Dugan & Lechtman supra note 74, at
381.
77. Klich, supra note 62, at 122.
78. Stephanie Flanders, Clear Thinking on Corruption, FIN. TIIES, June 23, 1997, at
10.
79. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development: Council Recom-
mendation on Bribery in International Business Transactions, OECD Doe. SGIPRESS
(94)36 (May 24, 1994), 33 IL.M. 1389, 1391-1392 (1994). In 1996, the OECD issued
a follow-up recommnendation to repeal tax deductions for bribes to foreign officials. Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development: Council Recommendation on
the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials, OECD Doe. C(96)27/FINAL
(April 11, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 1311 (1996).
80. Extortion and Bribery in International Business Transactions: 1996 Revisions to
the ICC Rules of Conduct, ICC Doc. (March 26, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 1307, 1308 (1996).
81. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, (March 29, 1996), 35 I.L.M.
724,727 (1996).
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further advocated an OECD treaty on adopting laws modeled on the
FPCA.82 America's international activism coincided with an increased
determination by governments to reduce the economic costs of the global
"corruption eruption. '8  However, international agreements have had
little practical impact on the business-government relationship in Rus-
sia.84
In summary, the FCPA serves as a useful case study in exporting
anticorruption laws. The debate over the FCPA reflects the tension be-
tween the right to petition the government and the need to combat cor-
ruption. Reaching across national borders to promote this aspirational
model created enforcement, interpretation, and practical difficulties.
America's international activism encouraged countries to combat cor-
ruption, but had little practical impact on Russia. This section has ex-
amined several pieces of a regulatory puzzle that influence the U.S. busi-
ness-government relationship, including campaign finance laws, bribery
statutes, ethics rules, public disclosure requirements, and multinational
agreements. The remainder of this Note explores how the United States
has fared in exporting one piece of that puzzle, regulation of lobbying, to
the Russian Federation.
II. Lobbying in Russia
Lobbying has taken hold in Russia. Inside the government, "presi-
dential lobbyists" from the executive branch attempt to influence federal
legislation and have become agents of stability and communication
85among competing factions. Outside the government, "undisciplined
lobbying" by the military-industrial complex, the agricultural sector and
other business interests has increasingly shaped national legislation.
86
This section discusses the business-government relationship underlying
this lobbying activity, the limits currently imposed on lobbying public
82. Corruption: Kicking the Kickbacks, ECONOMIST, May 31, 1997, at 61.
83. Id.
84. Dugan & Lechtman, supra note 72, at 379.
85. Thomas de Waal, Taming the Wolf for Boris, Moscow TIMES, Jan. 26, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News & Analysis File.
86. John P. Willerton & Aleksei A. Shulus, Constructing a New Political Process:
The Hegemonic Presidency and the Legislature, 29 J. MARSHALL L. RaV. 787, 816-17
(1995).
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officials, alternative models of regulation, and the attempt to export U.S.
business ethics to Russia.
A. The Business-Government Relationship
After a bloodless coup d'etat and during a period of rapid transition,
Bolshevik revolutionaries outlawed most independent business activity
in December of 1917Y Although the state permitted limited profit-
making activity by private cooperatives before the fall of communism,
capitalist enclaves contributed a minuscule percentage of official goods
and services.8 8 As a quasi-capitalist underground economy developed in
the shadow of central planning, the business-government relationship oc-
curred behind closed doors, with monetary tributes to public officials the
price for conducting profitmaking activity.69 The government responded
with successive anticorruption campaigns, arresting and branding as
criminal any private business activity.9° The Department for the Struggle
Against Theft of Socialist Property, known as the OBKSS, had authority
to investigate and prosecute black market entrepreneurs, with punish-
ment ranging from imprisonment to death.91 Faced with increased vigi-
lance in the drive to curb capitalism, businesses redoubled efforts to
bribe OBKSS officials and reach creative profit-sharing agreements. 92
Government officials increasingly turned to underground activity to sup-
plement their meager salaries.93 By the late 1980s, toleration of the un-
derground economy led to an "unholy alliance" between corrupt officials
87. BASILDMYTRYSHYN, USSR: A CONCISE HISToRY73-78 (4th ed. 1984).
88. Andrew T. Griffin & Larry D. Soderquist, Private Companies in the Soviet Un-
ion, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 201, 223 (1991).
89. Wolfgang Leonhard, THE KRENitN AND THE WEST: A REASC APPROACH 64-70
(1986) (describing the prinoshenie, or the portion of profits paid as bribes by business-
people).
90. Id. at 159-61 (arguing that anticorruption campaigns by Khrushchev in 1964,
Andropov in 1983 and Gorbachev in 1984 showed that "Soviet authorities, %,ith all their
power, [were] incapable of coping with the second economy and corruption in official
places.").
91. Id. at 68.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 69.
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and organized crime, a development that contributed to the strength of
the powerful Russian "mafiya."
94
The most significant economic development in post-communist
Russia has been industrial privatization. During the waning years of Mi-
chael Gorbachev's leadership from 1985 to 1991, a newly independent
legislature liberalized state controls and made private ownership possible
through a reform-inspired "war of legislation." 95 Early attempts to trans-
fer public property to private ownership resulted in what has been termed
"nomenklatura privatization," a process through which bureaucrats "used
their influence to reincorporate enterprises as private entities with them-
selves as major shareholders." 96 The business-government relationship
moved above ground, but retained its corrupt ways.
On June 21, 1991, Boris N. Yeltsin was elected president of the
Russian Federation in the first democratic election in Russia's history.
97
Following a failed hard-liner coup in August of 1991, reformers led by
Anatoly B. Chubias devised an ambitious voucher scheme to incorporate
Russian citizens into the privatization process. 98 Yeltsin seized on the
voucher plan as the country plunged into precipitous economic decline.
99
Reformers hoped that by legitimizing and expanding private activity, the
government could curtail growing mafiya violence and corruption. 00 In
part because the program was haphazardly implemented by decree, in-
dustrial privatization faced opposition by a parliament dominated by
former communist trade unions and industrial elites.
0 1
Analysts likened business conditions to the Gilded Age in the
United States, "characterized by monopolies, corruption, and endless
94. Daniel McGrory, Civilizing the Russian Underground Economy: Requirements
and Prospects for Establishing a Civil Economy in Russia, 5 TRAt4SNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 74 (1995).
95. Kent F. Moors, The Failure of Russian Privatization 1992-1994: How the In-
dustrial Nomenklatura Prevented Genuine Reform, 3 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-5 (1997).
96. Anthony V. Raftopol, Russian Roulette: A Theoretical Analysis of Voucher Pri-
vatization in Russia, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 435, 450-51 (1993).
97. David Renick, Yeltsin Elected President of Russia, WASH. POST, June 14, 1991
at Al.
98. Raftopol, supra note 96, at 443.
99. Id. at 442-443.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 486-488.
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loopholes" for those with power and influence.102 Privatization faced
uncertain prospects due to the imminent bankruptcy of industries, the
lack of investment capital, a resistant bureaucracy, lagging technology,
inconsistent and overlapping business regulations and the absence of a
legal infrastructure. 10 3 Booming trade o portunities existed side-by-side
with freewheeling disregard for the law.'
The country achieved a semblance of stability after voters narrowly
approved the "Yeltsin Constitution" by national plebiscite in December
of 1993.105 Economically, the constitution guaranteed free enterprise and
private ownership,106 although prospects for the enforcement of these
rights remained in doubt.1 7 Politically, the power to create a legal infra-
structure migrated from the legislature to a "hegemonic" executive
branch,108 although the success of communists and nationalists in the
1993 and 1994 elections insured that the presidential priority of privati-
zation would proceed at a cautious pace.'( To appease the old guard in
the legislature and insure reelection in 1996, Yeltsin replaced reformers
like Chubias with veterans of the nomankatura." 0
Under the Yeltsin Constitution, the new Federal Assembly consists
of two houses.1 The State Duma has 450 deputies, half elected from
districts and half elected according to political party."2 Duma Deputies,
assigned to committees in proportion to party representation, confirm top
102. Id. at 489-90 (citing Dorlinda Elliot & Natasha Lebedeva, A New Elite Fiddles as
the Economy Bums, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 1993, at 40).
103. Id. at 478-479; Investment Climate in Russia, RUXPUB, Sept. 30, 1996, avail-
able in 1996 WL 8618978.
104. Patricia Kranz, Welcome to Russia's Wild, Wild East, Bus. WK., June 27, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
105. John Lloyd, Russian Elections: Voters Hand Great Power to President, FIN.
TIMEs, Dec. 13, 1993, at 8.
106. KONST. RF. art. 8 (1993).
107. Christopher T. Ruder, Comment, Individual Economic Rights Under the New
Russian Constitution: A Practical Framework for Competitive Capitalism of Mere Theo-
retical Exercise?, 39 ST. Louis L. J. 1429, 1437-48 (1995).
108. Willerton & Shulus, supra note 86, at 803-805.
109. Id. at 789-90.
110. Moors, supra note 95, at 51.
111. Willerton & Shulus, supra note 86, at 812-13. See also for a general overview of
the current balance of powers, Government (last modified June 30, 1997)
<http://www.russiatoday.comlrtoday/govemgovem.htnl>.
112. Willerton & Shulus, supra note 86 at 803-05.
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executive officials and consider domestic legislation, budgetary issues
and international treaties.' 13 Legislation may originate through the com-
mittee process or directly by the executive branch.1 14 The Federation
Council has representatives from eighty-nine regions and typically con-
siders only broad federal issues such as use of the military and elec-
tions.115 The Federation Council has 14 days to act on legislation which
has passed the Duma, otherwise the bill is automatically forwarded to the
president for a veto decision, which can be overridden by a two-thirds
majority vote in both houses.116
In retrospect, the early stages of Russian privatization appear to
have created a business-government relationship dominated by the old
guard.1 17 Yeltsin's opposition in the Duma adjusted to privatization, un-
der which they could "secure privileges, property and profitable mo-
nopolies for their allies in the bureaucracy and the business elite."
118
Business interests united diverse factions by promising economic stabil-
ity.119 Accordingly, the legislature reluctantly adopted laws necessary
for private enterprise. 120
In July of 1993, Duma legislation permitted the creation and regis-
tration of Chambers of Commerce and Industry ("CCIs") to coordinate
activities among private enterprises, carry out independent analysis of
economic legislation, represent the legal interests of memb-rs in state
bodies, and cooperate with foreign enterprises.121 Registered CCIs be-
longed to a Russian Federation CCI, which issued permits to domestic
and foreign chambers of commerce and had the power to initiate legisla-
tion in the Duma.12 In April of 1995, the Duma adopted a law providing
113. Id. at 812-813.
114. Id. (noting that in the 1994-95 session, for example, two-thirds of the bills con-
sidered by the Duma were introduced by deputies).
115. Id. at 811.
116. Id.
117. Moors, supra note 95, at 1-3.
118. Willerton & Shulus, supra note 86, at 811.
119. Geoff Winestock, Desire for Stability Transcends Party Lines, Moscow TIMES,
Nov. 14, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, News & Analysis File.
120. Steve Liesman, Looking Back: Some Russian Officials Are Moving to Reverse
Business Privatization, WALL ST. J., March 20, 1996, at Al.
121. RF Fed. Act No. 5340-1 (July 7, 1993), art. 3.
122. Id. at art. 15, 16.
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a modem legal framework for recognition of public associations.12' The
most important step toward normalization of business activity was ap-
proval of part one of the Civil Code, which became effective on January
1, 1995 and replaced inadequate market-oriented laws enacted in the pe-
riod immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union.12 4 The
Civil Code, which narrowly passed the Duma, legalized entrepreneurial
activities and allowed for the creation of entities to engage in private
business.125
Concurrent with privatization, organized business interests made
forays into the political arena. Foremost among business associations
were the Russian Union of Manufacturers and Entrepreneurs, the
Roundtable for Russian Business and Entrepreneurs for a New Russia.
1 26
Our Home in Russia, a business-backed political party, premiered in the
1995 Duma elections.' 27 Behind the scenes business associations suc-
cessfully mimicked their American counterparts, not only by their names
and membership'2 but by disseminating sophisticated analysis and in-
formation through informal lobbyist structures.
1 29
123. RF Fed. Act No. 82-FZ (April 14, 1995). Article 27 allows a public associations
to freely disseminate information, take part in formulating government decisions, hold
meetings. engage in grassroots lobbying, participate in elections, and make proposals to
federal bodies. Id.
124. Kenneth A. Cutshaw, Russian Roulette, 43 FED. LAW. 30,32 (1995).
125. Id.; McGrory, supra note 94, at 97 fn. 82.
126. Russian Politics (visited Aug. 5, 1997) <http://wm.russia.netfpoliticstrussian
-parties review.html>.
127. Russian Federation Politics, INT'L COUNTRY RISK GUIDE EuR., Feb. 1, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 10211543.
128. For instance, the Round Table of Russian Business, although not formally asso-
ciated with the Business Roundtable in America, shares a similar scope of membership.
There are 70 collective members in the Roundtable of Russian Business, including the
association of Russian Banks, association of Privatized and Private Enterprises, the
League of Women-Managers and Entrepreneurs, the League of Christian Entrepreneurs
and others. Russian Politics (visited Aug. 5, 1997)
<http://www.russia.net/politics/russianparties..review.html>.
129. Id.; For example, after the death of a foreign businessman due to maflya vio-
lence, the Business Roundtable pledged to organize a "powerful lobby" in support of a
bill expanding the powers of security agencies. Press Conference with the Russian Busi-
ness Roundtable Association Leadership on Tragic Death of Iran Kivelidi (Official
Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, Aug. 8, 1995) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News
File.
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Lobbyism gradually entered the legislative lexicon. As early as
1993, reformist deputies asserted that professional lobbyism was "a
hallmark of development of a democratic society" and advocated regula-
tion of legislative lobbying based on the "American pattern." 130 During
the early stages of privatization:
There [were] no civilized ways of interacting with the authorities. So,
not only Mafia structures but also honest entrepreneurs turn !lobbyists.
Otherwise, with the continuing state monopoly reigning in the sphere
of production they [were] doomed to an early demise and, at best, an
eternal struggle for survival.1 31
As one Russian official said in 1994, "the word lobbyism has yet to win
recognition [among legislators] who, although familiar with and having
no objection to the practice as such, feel the term has undesirable con-
notations.' 32 In 1995, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Russia noted
that the "turmoil of the transition period in Russia has attracted many un-
savory characters who encourage unethical business practices" and rec-
ommended legislation to ensure that corruption not "become an accepted
part of the business situation" in Russia.133
The attempt to regulate business ethics through a 1995 law regulat-
ing lobbying took place against this unique backdrop. Similar to the
United States, the business-government relationship in Russia remained
adversarial. However, while the U.S. government acted over the course
of this century to reign in unbridled capitalism, the Duma reversed nearly
a century of Russian history to release it. As one observer has noted,
"Russia is attempting to do in a brief time what industrial democracies
130. Tatyana Skorobogatko, Business and Power: Dialogue Without an Outcome,
Moscow TIMES, June 4, 1993 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File. Irina Ha-
kamada, General Secretary of the Party of Economic Freedom, promoted a law drafted by
Russia's Institute of the USA and Canada "targeted at tightening control over official
lobbyist organizations." Id. The law, which would have regulated lobbying of the execu-
tive branch and outlawed executive lobbying, was the first lobbying regulation consid-
ered in the Duma. Id.
131. Id.
132. Anna Ostapchuk, The Presidential Lobbyists are Ready to Act, RUSSIAN PRESS
DIG., Aug. 2, 1994, available in 1994 WL 9141705 (interview with President Boris Yelt-
sin's first chief of an executive agency formed for interaction with legislators).
133. Natasha Mileusnic, Corruption Cited as Key Obstacle to Investment, MoSCoW
TIMES, June 27, 1995 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File. Th recommenda-
tion came from the executive director of the U.S Chamber of Commerce in Russia. Id.
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took centuries to accomplish, i.e. construct systems of public order that
maintain a continuously re-adjusting balance between private enterprise
and the market, legal institutions, and social values."'
34
B. Limitations to Legitimate Lobbying
If the Civil Code provided the necessary foundation for business de-
velopment, the Criminal Code provided a starting point for combating
corruption in government. Previous attempts at prosecuting officials for
embezzlement and bribery under treason and banditry laws proved
largely ineffectual.1 35  Decrees issued by President Yeltsin expanded
prosecutorial powers but dealt mainly with organized crime and lower
level civil servants.136 The new Criminal Code, effective January 1,
1997, monitored the interaction of government officials and business
representatives with the following provisions:
- Article 40 compelled officials to freely give to citizens any informa-
tion that directly concerns their individual rights or freedoms;
- Article 169 prohibited officials from hindering lawful entrepreneurial
activities;
- Article 204 made bribery among or by businesspeople punishable by
fines;
- Article 304 punished the provocation of bribery, or the attempt to
bribe an official for the purpose of blackmail.
137
Russian officials acknowledged that it would take years to disseminate
the Criminal Code, reevaluate pending cases and educate bureaucrats,
134. McGrory, supra note 94, at 87.
135. Alexander Larin, The Procurator-General is Forfeiting Public Trust, Moscow
NEws WKLY., Aug. 25, 1993, available in 1993 WL 10473126.
136. McGrory, supra note 94, at 90 (describing the 1994 Decree on Combating Or-
ganized Crime and Banditism in the Russian Federation); Klich, supra note 62, at 132-
133 (describing the 1992 Decree on Corruption, which forbids civil servants from ex-
ploiting their office to engage in entrepreneurial activity).
137. Alexander Osokin & Natalia Khroshavina, New Criminal Code Deals With Eco-
nomic Crimes, 37 Bus. INtErLIGENCE BuL., Sept. 19, 1996, available in 1996 WL
8405766 (interview with member of Duma's Committee for Legislation and Legal Re-
form).
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138police and prosecutors. Moreover, the criminal code did not directly
address corruption, thus freely permitted the lending of money among
businesspeople and public officials absent a showing of bribery."' As in
the American context, criminal bribery laws dealt with only the most
blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence govern-
mental action. 14°
Legislators, foreseeing that money may find avenues other than out-
right bribery to corrupt officials, also created a Central Electoral Com-
mission to track political contributions. 14' Russian election statutes al-
lowed private contributions to augment public subsidies, limited
contributions and expenditures, and required public disclosure.142 In the
Duma elections of December 1995, donations from private interests to
campaign funds were limited to just over 87 million rubles per donor. 143
In the presidential elections of 1996, wealthy business leaders that pros-
pered under economic reforms made sizable contributions to support
Yeltsin's reelection.144 As in the United States, those exercising control
over large aggregations of capital continued to influence the political
process.
Because the Duma had not yet passed an Administrative Code, bu-
reaucrats and officials were relatively unconstrained by procedural re-
quirements, standards and safeguards. 145 However, the Yeltsin admini-
stration issued decrees in early 1997 that opened the government
procurement process to regulatory scrutiny, addressed official corruption
in the banking system, and required government officials and members
138. Possehl, supra note 9, at 74.
139. Yuri Nikitinsky, Prosecutor General: Political Will Needed for War on Corrup-
tion, Moscow NEws, Dec. 19, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File (in-
terview with Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation).
140. See, supra notes 27-30.
141. The Law of The Election of President of the Russian
<http://www.russiatoday.com/
rtoday/special/electleleclaw3.htnl>.
142. Id. at arts. 44-46.
143. Russian Federation Politics, INT'L CouNTRY RISK GUIDE EUR., Feb. 1, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 10211543.
144. The Makings of a Molotov Cocktail, supra note 1, at S4.
145. McGrory, supra note 94, at 87-88.
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of the legislature to disclose their income and bank accounts.14 As in
the United States, these new ethics rules addressed corruption principally
through preventative measures.
Criminal, campaign finance, and ethics laws have drawn loose
boundaries around legitimate lobbying of federal bodies. Bribery can re-
sult in criminal prosecution, candidates report contributions to the Cen-
tral Electoral Commission, and public officials and legislators disclose
their total worth. However, in the absence of registration and public dis-
closure requirements for lobbyists, lobbying from inside and outside the
government takes place largely in the dark.
Lobbyists inside the government are under the control of the Presi-
dential Department of Interaction with Deputies to the Federal Assem-
bly, an executive agency which promotes friendly relations between the
executive branch and legislature. 47 The agency began operating with the
first session of the State Duma in 1994.14" As Andrei Loginov, the first
chief of the subdivision responsible for interaction with Duma deputies,
observed: "In a Presidential republic, the head of the state not only takes
part in shaping the Government's course, but also in getting it approved
by the Parliament."' 49 Recognizing the importance of informal contacts,
presidential lobbyists attend plenary sessions, faction meetings, com-
mittee hearings, and mix with deputies in the corridors.1, 3 Loginov em-
phasized ethical behavior by these intra-governmental lobbyists:
In communicating with the deputies, we are, of course, aware of their
needs and problems, including the housing ones, but we never try to
capitalize on this. There is a strict ethical code in civilized lobbying,
and we are obliged to abide by it. For our behavior naturally reflects
on the President's image. Therefore, we never use excessive pressure.
Faced with resistance, we do not look for sophisticated bypasses. On
the contrary, we try, which is more difficult, to think up some agree-
ment procedure.15 1
146. Press Briefing with Boris Nemstov, (Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, June
4, 1997) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
147. Ostapchuk, supra note 132.
148. Willerton and Shulus, supra note 86, at 812.
149. Ostapchuk, supra note 132.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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The give-and-take process of direct legislative negotiation described by
Loginov would be familiar to American-style lobbyists. The crucial dif-
ference, of course, is that these lobbyists are employed by the govern-
ment. Presidential lobbyists coordinate with interests outside the gov-
ernment, but only when they coincide with presidential priorities.152
Lobbyists from outside the government operate without formal
oversight. Like presidential lobbyists, undisciplined lobbying by special
interests relies on the informal arrangements and negotiations that char-
acterize the post-Soviet political system. 53  Complicating the task of
lobbyists from outside the government, and the analysis of their activity,
is the blurred line between the underground economy, still dominated by
an alliance of organized crime and complicit bureaucrats, and the official
economy. 154 The result is an unhappy connection in the public mind of
business, criminal and political activity.' 55
Representatives of powerful economic sectors have influenced the
content and implementation of legislation. 56 Agriculture sector lobby-
ists reportedly work through the Communist Party, or KPRF, and Agrar-
ian Party. 57 In many cases, privatization handed ownership of massive
government-owned enterprises to their former communist managers, who
now support the KPRF158 The energy sector strongly supports the po-
litical activities of Prime Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin, a former di-
rector of the centralized gas industry Gazprom. 59 Oil and metal pro-
ducing companies operate under the control of banks with close, and
152. Id. ("Our work is assessed by one criterion only-the passage or non-passage of
bills submitted by the President.")
153. Willerton and Shulus, supra note 86, at 816.
154. McGrory, supra note 24, at 68-69.
155. The Makings of a Molotov Cocktail, supra note 1, at S4.
156. Willerton and Shulus, supra note 86, at 816.
157. Id. at 817; President Yeltsin recently recognized the power of Russia's bloated,
beleaguered farm lobby in cabinet reshuffling. Timothy Heritage, Yeltsin Backs Govern-
ment Reforms, Reuters, May 19, 1997, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
158. Chernomyrdin Government Has Mixed Record (last modified Mar. 5, 1997)
<http:lwww.russiatoday.comlrtoday/news/03.html>.
159. Moors, supra note 95, at 52 n.46. While Chemomyrdin claims to earn only $700
a month and not to own stock in Gazprom, Russian newspapers reported that he has
amassed $5 billion from his connections with the monopoly while in office. Carol J.
Williams, Russians in Tizzy Over Wealth of Prime Minister, L.A. ImEs, April 11, 1997,
at Al. Responding to the scandal, both reformers and communists in the Duma called
for public disclosure of personal wealth. Id.
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allegedly corrupt, links to the govemment.' 6° By one account, business
interests can subsidize staff expenses for Duma deputies by paying a sur-
charge to party factions.'
61
President Yeltsin recognized in his first state of the nation address
since his re-election in 1996 that "the power of entrenched lobbies" was
the main danger of his second term. 162 As one observer has concluded,
"until these lobbying activities are brought into the open and regulated,
they will continue to constitute an important and unpredictable dimen-
sion of the Russian decision-making process."' 1
63
Included among undisciplined lobbyists are representatives of for-
eign business interests. The American Chamber of Commerce in Russia
and the U.S.-Russia Business Council, like their counterparts in the
United States, offer members services and information on legislation.16
4
Even hard-line communists appear before foreign business audiences in
order to encourage investment. 65 Major American corporations typically
require their employees to follow codes of conduct applying principles of
"universal ethical applicability."'66 Enterprises with foreign investments
must register with the Ministry of Economy 67 At the present time, how-
ever, self-regulation is the only real restraint on lobbying activity by for-
eign business interests in Russia.
160. Chernomyrdin Government Has Mixed Record (last modified Mar. 5, 1997)
<http:lwww.russiatoday.comlrtodaynewslO3.html>.
161. Jonas Bernstein, Reform Follows Function: Ministerial Intrigue and Unbridled
Corruption Come First, AM. SPECTATOR, May 1997, at 63.
162. Mark Whitehouse, Battle Joined: President v. The Lobbies, Moscow TwEs,
March 7, 1997, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News & Analysis File.
163. Willerton and Shulus, supra note 86, at 817.
164. Russian Federation Politics, supra note 127; See, e.g., AmCham Publications
(visited Aug. 5, 1997) <http://www.amcham.ru>.
165. Anne McElvoy, The Unmaking of the President, TMES (London), Mar. 11, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
166. Klich, supra note 62, at 142-143. Some American firms have joined nongov-
ernmental organizations to advocate that governments require ethics codes as a condition
of doing business. ld. at 144.
167. The Ministry of Finance requires incorporation documents and proof of the legal
status of investors but not information about lobbying activities. See State Registration
of Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Their Affliates (visited Aug. 5, 1997)
<http://www.fipc.ru/fipc/qa.tp8.html>.
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C. Alternatives for Regulating Lobbying
Duma deputies have more room to legislate under tha Yeltsin Con-
stitution than their American counterparts under the U.S. Constitution.
Article 29 guarantees freedom of speech and disallows propaganda or
campaigning that instigates social, racial, national or religious hatred and
enmity.168 Article 30 guarantees freedom of association. 69 Article 32
grants the right to take part in the administration of the state's affairs
both directly and through representatives. 170 Under Articles 55 and 56,
the Duma has authority to enact federal laws restricting these civil liber-
ties to protect the constitutional system17' or in a state of emergency. 172
As one observer has surmised, "the Russian constitution envisions
drawing a balance between free speech and other competing values."''
Through their proposals to combat corruption in the business-
government relationship, conservative and reform deputies have drawn a
different balance between these competing values. 74
The U.S. and Russian constitutions start from different assumptions.
Under the U.S. Constitution, what is not enumerated as a power of gov-
ernment is reserved to the people. 175 In other words, what is not regu-
lated is generally legal. By contrast, the legal tradition in the former So-
viet Union, and the Russian Empire before it, operated under
authoritarian and totalitarian forms of government. 76 The presumption
of legality was reversed; what was not permitted by the state was gener-
ally illegal. In political terms, communist ideology did not tolerate
168. KONsT. RF, art. 29 (1993).
169. Id. art. 30.
170. Id. art. 32.
171. Id. art. 55.
172. Id. art. 56.
173. Melissa Dawson, Free Speech and the Mass Media in Russia: Lessons From the
December 1993 Election and Constitutional Referendum, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
881, 881-82 (1995).
174. Id. ('This balancing process will be heavily influenced by the paricular vision of
democracy held by those entrusted with interpreting the constitution.").
175. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. X ("[Plowers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution... are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
176. Molly Warner Lien, Red Star Trek: Seeking a Role for Constitutional Law in So-
viet Disunion, 30 STAN. J. INT'LL. 41, 43 (1994).
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speech in opposition to state goals.1" In economic terms, activity not
under the state's control of centralized planning and ownership became
part of the illegal underground economy.'7 Following the Soviet tradi-
tion, political and economic rights under the Yeltsin Constitution remain
"affirmative rights," granted by the state and subject to diminution. 179
Comparisons between balanced and dominant visions of the U.S.
First Amendment and the development of rights found in the Yeltsin
Constitution have not escaped scholarly notice. From one perspective,
the attempt to establish free access to government has resulted in "con-
siderable uncertainty, inconsistency, and fluctuation in the scope and
definition of constitutional rights of expression as well as informa-
tion." 180 From another perspective, developing defamation law, which
hinges on Article 29's prohibition of socially disruptive propaganda, ex-
emplifies a Russian proclivity for government restrictions. 18' Using ex-
ecutive decrees, Yeltsin set an early precedent for Article 29 by censor-
ing the press during a state of emergency in October 1993.16 More
recently, Yeltsin's campaign advisors aggressively employed state-
regulated media to push his re-election in 1996.183
Faced with mafiya violence and ubiquitous graft, conservatives have
harkened to the anticorruption drives of the late Soviet period.184 Em-
phasizing the need for punitive measures, Prosecutor General Yuri
Skuratov has argued that for state bureaucrats "that which is not ex-
177. ld.
178. McGrory, supra note 94, at 67.
179. Ruder, supra note 107, at 1429-30.
180. Foster, supra note 50, at 272.
181. Peter Krug, Civil Defamation Law and the Press in Russia: Private and Public
Interests the Civil Code, and the Constitution, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 297, 331-
332 (1996).
182. Dawson, supra note 173, at 883 n.9.
183. Michael Kramer, The Secret Story of How Four U.S. Advisors Used Polls, Focus
Groups, Negative Ads and All the Other Techniques of American Campaigning to Help
Boris Yeltsin Win, TME, July 15, 1996, at 32.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 89-93; Yeltsin's nationalist rival, Alexander
Lebed, has advocated increased incarceration to reduce organized crime. Alexander Le-
bed, What Ails Russia, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 1997, at A14; The 1996 campaign of com-
munist presidential candidate Gennedy Zyganov benefited from the perception that eco-
nomic reformers were incapable of reducing mafia violence. Bill Powell and Betsy
McKay, Russian Roulette, NEWsWEEK, June 12, 1996, at 29.
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pressly permitted should be forbidden.' 85 In the anticorruption laws en-
acted following privatization, the conservative view that penalties on il-
licit contact with public officials should be incorporated in the Criminal
Code has generally prevailed over concerns of restricting free speech.'86
Until recently, the Duma resisted measures to regulate the interac-
tion of public officials and business interests. During the first session of
the Duma, prominent businessmen and their allies in the legislature cre-
ated an Interdepartmental Commission of the Security Council of the
Russian Federation, Combating Crime and Corruption, which operated
under Minister of Justice Valentin Kovalev. 187 As the pace of privatiza-
tion slowed, Duma conservatives formed a temporary Committee for the
Correction of Privatization to investigate unpunished abuses in the trans-
fer of property to the private sector. 188 By 1997, Yeltsin and Duma con-
servatives seemed to reach consensus that new punitive m,.asures were
necessary to combat corruption in the business-government relation-
ship. 89
D. Exporting the U.S. Model
Experts from the United States have helped Russian policymakers
cope with political and economic change through aspirational models,
direct involvement, and advice from afar. These approaches to providing
185. Leonid Nikitinsky, Prosecutor General: Political Will Needed fir War on Cor-
ruption, Moscow TIMEs, Dec. 19, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis LLbrary, News &
Analysis File.
186. Possehl, supra note 9, at 73; Ilya Smirnov, Opposition to Anti-Corruption Law
Very Strong, RUSSIAN PRESS DIGEST, May 21, 1994, available in 1994 WL 9142999.
187. Id. Kovalev, a former Duma deputy educated in both American and Russian law,
eventually resigned when the Russian press published photographs of him in a sauna fre-
quented by the mafiya. Richard Beeston, Russian Minister of Justice Resigns Over Sex
Scandal, TIMES (LONDON), JUNE 23, 1997, at 14, available in 1997 WL 9210583; Kova.
lev, Valentin Alexeyevich, Russia.Net Biographies Database (visited Mar. 5, 1997)
<http://www.russia.net/cgi-bin>.
188. Steve Liesman, Looking Back: Some Russian Officials Are Moving to Reverse
Business Privatization, WALL ST. J., March 20, 1996, at Al.
189. Yeltsin Steps Up Fight to Weed Out Corruption, WALL ST. J. EUR., April 11,
1997, available in 1997 WL WSJE 3809472. Yeltsin stated: "I will fight this to the end.
People will be afraid to misappropriate public funds and take bribes." Id. Gennady
Seleznyov, the communist Speaker of the Duma, promised his full cooperation: "I have
long waited for a political statement by the president and have said on more than one oc-
casion that his political will is needed for effectively fighting corruption." Id.
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technical assistance converged in the effort export the U.S. model for
regulating lobbying.
Whether the FCPA and other international anticorruption efforts in-
fluenced Russian policymakers is debatable. 9' Reaching across national
borders to promote business ethics through the FCPA resulted in en-
forcement, interpretation, and implementation difficulties1 91 An un-
happy interconnection of criminal, political, and business activity en-
dured. 92 While the Duma adopted criminal prohibitions on bribery,
legitimate lobbying remained largely unregulated. 93 In short, the aspi-
rational model of the FCPA has not effectively exported the U.S. model
for regulating lobbying.
Direct involvement by U.S. experts in Russian economic and politi-
cal policymaking has had mixed success. In economic matters, observers
familiar with both the civil law tradition in socialist societies and the
common law development of cerporate governance in the United States
have questioned whether applying Western standards to Russia's unique
experiment with privatization did more harm than good.194 In political
matters, the secret hiring of prominent U.S. consultants to advise on
polling, focus groups, negative ads and other campaigning practices ad-
vantaged an institutionally powerful incumbent. 95 In criminal matters,
the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation has advised Russian prosecutors
on techniques for combating mafiya violence. 96 One observer darkly
warned against exporting American methods within a governmental
structure that could allow a president to exercise near-dictatorial power,
especially if unchecked by a like-minded, freely elected legislature.'"
Another pessimist intoned: "[p]oliticians and populace alike now blame
much of Russia's economic, political, and social ills on misguided, me-
chanical transplantation of foreign models."'
93
190. See supra Part I.D.
191. See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 155.
193. See supra Part I.B.
194. Baev, supra note 3, at 248.
195. Kramer, supra note 183, at 28.
196. Asnis, supra note 3, at 313-314.
197. Russian Federation Politics, supra note 127.
198. Foster, supra note 50, at 274
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The experience of Harvard's Institute for International ;Development
("HIID") exemplifies the danger of corruption undermining the advisory
process itself.199 Funded by the U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment ("USAID"), HIID's Russian Privatization Center drafted legislation
governing private enterprises and worked closely with Anatoly Chubias
on implementation of industrial privatization.200 USAID suspended
funding in early 1997 when investigators found that HIID directors had
invested in the Russian capital markets they helped create. ' The expe-
rience embittered Harvard advisors, advantaged opponents of Russian
reform, and contributed to an anti-American sentiment in Russia. °2
Like a lifeguard hailed by a swimmer struggling in unpredictable
currents, U.S experts must approach the object of their aid with aware-
ness that engagement may harm both parties. The dangers of direct in-
volvement suggest that U.S. experts maintain a safe distance when en-
gaging with Russian policymakers. However, simply advising from afar
may fall short of saving the swimmer. For example, in 1993 the Ameri-
can Bar Association ("ABA") sponsored a five day meeting with a Rus-
sian delegation which included legislators and the Executive Secretary of
the commission working on the Yeltsin Constitution. 20 3 Although work-
shops with leading U.S. academics and practitioners produc:ed a spirited
dialogue, one panelist concluded: "We all left the meeting thinking that
our comments were relatively insignificant compared with the economic,
law and order and political problems now facing Russia.' 2 4
The ABA's Central and Eastern European Law Initiative
("CEELr'), which co-sponsored the 1993 meeting, has incorporated
various approaches to providing technical advice to Russia policymak-
199. David Filipov and David Marcus, Probe of Russian Work Shock" Harvard Advi-
sor, BOSTON GLOBE, May 25, 1997 at Al.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Central and East European Law Initiative: Technical Legal Assistance Work-
shops, Legal Training, Draft Law Assessments, Concept Papers, Resident Liaisons and
Legal Specialists, Sister Law School Program, Other Projects (Jan. 22, 1993) (unpub-
lished brochure) (on file with author).
204. Memorandum from Vigo G. Nielsen (Feb. 17, 1993) (on file with author). It was
obvious to this participant that "most of the considerations relate[d] to politics within
present day Russia and not the wording of individual provisions or any constitutional
lessons learned by Americans in the 1770's or later." Id.
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ers. Concept papers, which discuss major issues legislation must ad-
dress, provide aspirational guidance on broad topics such as election
law.205 Liaisons reside in host countries to forge relationships in the le-
gal community and receive requests for technical assistance from poli-
cymakers.20 After a request, CEELI's central office in Washington,
D.C. recruits scholars, judges, practitioners and other experts to com-
ment on draft legislation.2 7 CEELI then summarizes these recommen-
dations in Legal Assessments, which it sends to the liaison for presenta-
tion to the requesting public official.20°  CEELI guards against the
dangers of direct involvement:
The assessments are not designed to redraft the laws in accordance
with the United States' laws or dictate the particular direction the law
should take; rather, the assessments are intended to raise issues the
drafters may not have considered and provide a spectrum of options
from which the drafters of the laws can select the approach most ap-
propriate for their countries' needs.:
CEELI, which began providing legal assessments to Russia in 1992, re-
ceives eighty percent of its funding from USAID and requires partici-
pants to follow a code of ethics to avoid conflicts of interests and the ap-
pearance of conflicts of interest.
210
During the summer of 1995, the Duma's Committee on Public and
Religious Organizations considered a federal law "On Regulating Lob-
bying Activities in Federal Governing Bodies." 21 1 This section has ex-
amined the business-government relationship which this legislation at-
tempted to regulate, alternatives available under the Yeltsin Constitution,
and approaches of technical assistance from the United States. The fail-
205. Legal Assessments and Concept Papers (visited Aug. 5, 1997)
<http://www.abaneLorg/ceeli/assessments.html>.
206. Telephone Interview with Geoffrey K. Bentz, Director, Legal Assessments Pro-
gram, CEELI (July 17, 1997).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Legal Assessments and Concept Papers, supra note 205.
210. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN LAW INmIATIvE
ANNUAL REPORT 3, 39 (1996). As of 1996, CEELI had performed pro bono work valued
at more than $55 million. Id. at 6.
211. On Regulating Lobbying Activities in Federal Governing Bodies (May 31, 1995)
(on file with author) [hereinafter "Draft Legislation"].
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ure of this legislation, despite assistance from U.S. experts, presents the
question of whether the U.S. model for regulating lobbying could, or
should, be exported to Russia.
HI. The Attempt to Pass Lobbying Law Based on the U.S.
Model in Russia
In the midst of political and economic change, the Duma created a
legal infrastructure to accommodate the emerging business-government
relationship. By 1995, the Duma passed laws establishing chambers of
commerce and industry, guaranteeing the right to public associations,
and normalizing business activity through the Civil Code.213 This section
examines the attempt to fortify the legal infrastructure of the business-
government relationship with a lobbying law based on the U.S. model.
Vladimir Lepekhin, Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Public
and Religious Organizations, circulated draft legislation "On Regulating
Lobbying Activities in Federal Governing Bodies" during the summer of
1995.214 The committee solicited comments from various gioups inside
and outside of Russia.21 ,5 Recommendations by U.S. experts illustrate the
difficulties of exporting the U.S. model of lobbying regulation to the216
Russian Federation. The legislation advanced modest goals, defined
lobbyism, granted broad rights to lobbyists, demanded limited disclosure,
imposed new restrictions, addressed foreign lobbying, and imposed civil
fines.
212. See Part II, B.
213. See supra notes 121-125 and accompanying text.
214. Draft Legislation, supra note 211; Russian Federation, CEELI UPDATE, Spring
1995, at 1.
215. From inside Russia, the law was reviewed by representatives of domestic organi-
zations ranging from the Russian Academy of Sciences to the Moscow State Institute of
Foreign Affairs. The Committee on Public and Religious Organizations also heard from
leading U.S. businesses in Moscow, American-based law firms, and international asso-
ciations, such as the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia.
216. The advice from U.S. experts discussed in this section comes principally from
two sources: American Bar Association, Central and East European Law Initiative,
Analysis of the Draft Law on the Regulation of Lobbying Activity for the Russian Fed-
eration (May 31, 1995) (on file with author) (hereinafter CEELI Assessment) and On
Regulating Lobbying Activities in Federal Governing Bodies (June 31, 1995) (with sug-
gested edits) (on file with author) [hereinafter Edited Draft Legislation].
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The goals of the law were modest, accommodating the current real-
ity of lobbying without curtailing its legitimate practice. Article 1 stated
the goals of the Federal law as follows:
(a) Assistance to the implementation of the constitutional rights of citi-
zens of the Russian Federation to participate individually or thorough
different organizations in managing state affairs by influencing the de-
cision making process in governing bodies;
(b) Providing for more openness and professionalism in legislative and
other activities of federal state bodies;
(c) The legalization and regulation of lobbying activities.217
Subdivision (a) reiterated the mandate of Articles 29, 30 and 32 of the
Yeltsin Constitution, providing for free association and access to infor-
mation as a means for directly influencing government action.2 s Subdi-
vision (b) recognized that disclosure of lobbying would create profes-
sionalism in government and establish a civilized way of interacting with
authorities. 219 By legalizing lobbying under subdivision (c), the Duma
could regulate lobbyists just as it would later criminalize bribery by
businesspeople, prohibit public officials from hindering lawful entrepre-
neurial activities, and mandate citizen access to information under the
Criminal Code.220 Like the Federal Regulation and Lobbying Act of
1946, then still regulating federal lobbying in the United States, the law
envisioned a positive role for lobbyism.221 Unlike the American model,
the goals did not explicitly identify dangers addressed by the legislation,
such as misleading or secretive lobbying by organized special inter-
ests.Y2
Article 3 of the draft legislation defined lobbying as the attempt to
influence the development, adoption, or implementation of legislative
acts and executive decisions.m Lobbyists would include authorized
217. Draft Legislation, supra note 211, art. 1, § 1.1.
218. KONST. RF, art. 29, §§ 2,4 (1993).
219. See text accompanying notes 131, 151.
220. See text accompanying note 137.
221. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
222. Id. The draft law did, however, allow for criminal prosecution under defamation
laws for threats, insults and propaganda against Duma deputies. See Draft Legislation,
supra note 211, art. 10, § 3.
223. Draft Legislation, supra note 211, art. 3. 3.1. ("[Ihe activities of legal and
physical persons in relation to the federal governing bodies with the purpose of influ-
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agents and staff members of public and private organizations. 224 Pres-
entation of information to federal bodies, participation in public discus-
sions, verbal and written contacts with public officials, expert analysis of
government acts not requested by officials, and other forms of interac-
tion would be regulated as legitimate lobbying activities. 225 U.S. experts
advised an exception for grassroots lobbying and presidential lobby-
ing.2 6 However, the broad scope of the draft law may have suited to the
complexities of the informal contacts characterizing the business-
government relationship in post-Soviet Russia.227
Article 7 of the draft legislation assured lobbyist access to unclassi-
fied information from state bodies and public officials.228 U.S. experts
criticized Article 7 as unworkable:
The language suggests actual participation in the discussions and
meetings of committees during the drafting of a law. Lobbyist; appear
to be granted access even to private meetings, whether or not partici-
pants object. This is not acceptable because lobbyists are not elected
officials and should not have such direct influence in the creation of
legislation.2
2 9
While unacceptable by American standards, Russian legislators had be-
come accustomed to presidential lobbyists,230 public associations,231
encing the development, adoption and implementation by the latter of legislative acts and
administrative decisions on behalf and in the interest of their clients are understood as
lobbying activities.").
224. Duma members and their staff could not act as lobbyists. Id. art. 5.1, (a), (b).
225. Id. art. 6.
226. The CEELI Assessment recommended that, as under American disclosure law,
the draft law address only "direct lobbying." CEELI Assessment, supra note 216, at 4.
"Creating laws limiting free speech would be a more appropriate manrer to address
grassroots lobbying, while an ethics law would better address relation. between the
branches of government." Id. at 4 n. 10.
227. A law based on the narrower definition found in FRLA may have failed to sig-
nificantly monitor special interest pressure. See supra note 40.
228. Draft Legislation, supra note 211, art. 7, § 1 ("Lobbyists have the right to obtain
any unclassified information from the appropriate state bodies, as well a:; amendments
and suggestions on the lobbying bill or other normative act."). See id. § 2 ("Lobbyists
are guaranteed access to both the Russian Federation Federal Assembly, its committees
and commissions, and to the Russian Federation executive bodies, and guaranteed the
opportunity to meet with deputies and officials of the federal executive bodies.").
229. CEELI Assessment, supra note 216, at 5.
230. See supra note 114.
231. See supra note 123.
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chambers of commerce and industry,232 and foreign advisors7- 3 drafting
legislation. Article 32 of the Yeltsin Constitution, and later Article 40 of
the Criminal Code, appeared to guarantee citizen participation in the af-
fairs of government.
At the heart of the legislation, Articles 8 and 9 provided for public
disclosure of lobbying activity.
" Article 8 detailed a system of registration and disclosure under the
Ministry of Justice. The Ministry would develop registration
documents, scrutinize the accuracy of required filing, analyze
lobbying, and provide public access to disclosed information.
Lobbyists would pay a fee and re-register each year;235
* Article 9 specified the content of disclosure forms. Lobbyists
would be required to file semi-annual forms detailing who was
lobbied, resources received, expenses incurred, and results
achieved.26
Article 8 resembled the passive role of U.S. federal lobbying provi-
sions. 7 The draft legislation was designed to expose lobbying practices,
not fundamentally alter them. However, Article 9 would have required
more disclosure than the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 by scrutiniz-
ing "results achieved.
' 238
U.S. experts recommended amending Article 8 to give the title of
Registered Professional Lobbyists to those lobbyists who complied with
the law, thus distinguishing them from those lobbying in violation of the
act239 and Article 9 to reduce reporting requirements to a "brief descrip-
tion" of clients and replacing specific accounting requirements with a
listing of activities performed on behalf of clients."4
The amendments to Article 8 highlighted the challenge of separating
business, criminal, and political activities. Accustomed to close ties with
232. See supra note 121.
233. See supra note 200.
234. See text accompanying notes 137, 170.
235. Draft Legislation, supra note 211, art. 8, § 1.
236. Id. at art. 9, § 1.
237. See Part LB.
238. Ld.
239. Edited Draft Legislation, supra note 216, art. 8, § 1.
240. Id. art. 9, § 1.
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both public officials and the mafiya, business lobbyists would be forced
to identify themselves as professional from outside the government. The
recommended amendments to Article 9 reflected the reluctance in U.S.
jurisprudence to demand reporting requirements so onerous as to imper-
missibly burden legitimate lobbying activity.241 In the words of Justice
Jackson, the disclosure provisions of the draft law afforded the "greatest
freedom of access" to government officials but required reporting of re-
242suits achieved as a price for that access.
The Russian lobbying law would have achieved several restrictions
on federal lobbying. Article 5 would have disallowed elected officials
and their staffs from lobbying for one year after expiration of their
authority.243 Article 10 would have prohibited, and allowed prosecution
for, propaganda campaigns which discredit officials, bribery, blackmail,
threats and insults, and knowing distribution of false information. Sanc-
tions would apply to criminal activity directed toward officials, relatives
and other persons close to officials. 244 Article 5 would have imported the
"revolving door" concept of U.S. ethics rules.245 Article 10 represented
the most significant departure from the U.S. model by limiting the free
speech capabilities of lobbyists.
U.S. experts recommended amending Article 5 to bar contributions
from lobbyists to the political campaigns of public officials 246 and Arti-
cle 10 to eliminate sanctions for propaganda, for non-physical threats
and for any crime involving "persons close to" officials. 24
7
The amendment to Article 5 would have imported a campaign fi-
nance reform favored by critics of the corrupting influence of money in
politics. In contrast, U.S. advisors were uncomfortable with the lati-
tude given to prosecutors under the law. Article 10 adopted the language
of Article 29 of the Yeltsin Constitution, 249 reflected the likely course of
241. See supra note 60. Even under California law, the requirement would not likely
be found so onerous as to constitute an impermissible burden on legitimate lobbying. Id.
242. See text accompanying note 57.
243. Draft Legislation, supra note 211, art. 5.
244. Id. art. 5-9.
245. See text accompanying note 39.
246. Edited Draft Legislation, supra note 216, art. 5.
247. Id. at art. 10.
248. See supra note 50.
249. KONsT. RF, art. 29, § 2 (1993).
[Vol. 20:815
Exporting Ethics
defamation law,250 accommodated the conservative view emphasizing
prosecution,51 and addressed the threat of mafiya violence by including
a Duma deputy's inner circle in the purview of prosecutorial power.
The enforcement provisions in Article 10 recognized the distinction
between offenses punishable under the Criminal Code and violation of
disclosure responsibilities. 2 The Ministry of Justice could suspend lob-
bying licenses and fine lobbyists supplying incomplete or false data to
the ministry.Y However, given the U.S. experience with spotty regis-
tration, 4 and the profits to be made by illicit lobbying in Russia,2 5 even
the sizable civil fine my not have been sufficient to ensure compliance.
Finally, the proposed Russian law permitted lobbying by foreign or-
ganizations but not by citizens of foreign countries.2- By freely permit-
ting lobbying by agents of foreign business interests, the legislation de-
parted from U.S. policy under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of
1938.258 The departure is surprising in light of the popular distrust of the
transplantation of foreign models but practical in light of the role U.S.
experts have played in drafting Russian laws.
Ultimately, the Committee on Public and Religious Organizations
rejected most U.S. recommendations and the legislation failed to pass the
Duma. This Note suggests several explanations for that failure. First,
entrenched interests may have seen the legislation as a threat to presi-
dential lobbying and the undisciplined lobbying among business, crimi-
nal, and political interests. The business community, through its allies in
the Duma, may have been hesitant about exposing current practices. The
unholy alliance of organized crime and corrupt officials may have
250. Krug, supra note 181, at 297.
251. See text accompanying notes 185-186.
252. Draft Legislation, supra note 211, art. 10.
253. Id.
254. See supra notes 11, 40.
255. See supra note 78.
256. Alternatively, the draft law could have, like the Lobbying Disclosure Act of
1995, included criminal liability for perjury. See supra note 45.
257. Draft Legislation, supra note 211, art. 3, § 4.
258. See text accompanying note 40. Critics of FARA have questioned the rationale
of limiting foreign contributions in an era of multilateral business activity. See Jeffrey K.
Powell, Prohibitions on Campaign Contributions from Foreign Sources: Questioning
Their Justification in a Global Interdependent Economy, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 957
(1996); Troy, supra note 5, at 31.
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worked to thwart disclosure. Second, the tumult and uncertainty of the
approaching presidential election may have overshadowed and bogged
down progress on regulating lobbying. Communists and nationalists op-
posing Yeltsin counted on corruption as a potent campaign issue. Third,
the conservative majority in the Duma may have used its political muscle
to reject the disclosure model in favor of increased prosecution under the
criminal code. Like Congress, the Duma may have been incapable of
striking a balance between the right to petition the government and the
need to combat corruption.
There exists another explanation for the failure to export the U.S.
model of lobbying regulation. Similar to the attempt to enact corporate
governance codes, import election practices, and adopt techniques to ad-
dress organized crime, legislators Russian may have perceived unin-
tended consequences of transplanting the U.S. model.2 9 The approach
of sending expert advice as a foreign aid avoided the dangers of dictating
an American result or falling prey to corruption in the advisory process
itself but failed to produce workable legislation. The method of dialogue
between U.S. legal advisors and Duma deputies was insufficient. One
U.S. advisor later reflected that like the 1993 ABA conference in Wash-
ington, D.C. on the proposed Yeltsin Constitution,W "neither side under-
stood what was being said by the other side."261
IV. Courses for the Future
This Note argues that the effort to export U.S. anticorruption laws
as a form of foreign aid has become insufficient to help Russians cope
with the lobbying dimension of the evolving business-government rela-
tionship in that country. In early 1997, the Clinton Administration re-
quested $535 million in new funds for a Partnership for Freedom to as-
sist Russia and other Central European countries.2 Secretary of State
Madeline Albright explained:
259. See text accompanying notes 194-198
260. See text accompanying notes 203-204.
261. Ann Mizel, Lessons in Lobbying for a Fledgling Democracy, ARK, July 5, 1995,
at 2.
262. Prepared Statement of Secretary Albright Before the House Appropriations
Committee, Foreign Relations Subcommittee, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 12, 1997),
available in LEXIS, News Library, Federal News Service File.
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This reflects an evolution in our approach to the region. For years, we
have been providing technical advice on how to achieve political and
economic reform. Our focus will now be on cementing the irreversible
nature of those reforms. The initiative will concentrate on activities to
promote business, trade and investment and that would strengthen de-
mocracy and more fully establish the rule of law.263
It is appropriate, therefore, to end this analysis with consideration of
future courses of action for regulating lobbying activity in Russia. These
options shed light on the appropriate nature of the evolution in foreign
aid policy.
TRY AGAIN. This option reflects the possibility that the attempt to
regulate lobbying activity in Russia was correct in concept but flawed in
implementation. As political waters calm, and undisciplined lobbying
becomes increasingly intolerable, legislators can better focus on corrup-
tion in their ranks. With passage of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of
1995, U.S. experts may have new perspectives to share. This optimistic
view holds that U.S. law can continue to serve as an aspirational model
for the business-government relationship in Russia. As Artyom Tarasov,
an early supporter of anticorruption laws commented, "I am not that na-
ive to believe that a legislative act will solve all our problems, but we
have to begin somewhere." 2
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STEP BACK. This option rests on the assumption that the approach
of exporting the U.S. model has outlived its usefulness in shaping eco-
nomic and political development in the Russian Federation. Russia's
mafiya presence, legal tradition, and political priorities require that
Duma deputies create unique solutions to combat corruption in the busi-
ness-government relationship. Having provided valuable technical as-
sistance, U.S. experts must disengage, observe, and provide advice from
a healthy distance. Otherwise, despite good intentions, the United States
might do more harm than good. In essence, this view would let Russians
deal with the problem of lobbying as the Russians will.
INTEGRATED APPROACH. This option holds that the attempt to pass
lobbying reform in 1995 was flawed in both concept and implementation.
It recognizes, in the words of Secretary Albright, that the U.S. approach
for advising Russian policymakers must evolve in order to cement demo-
263. Id.
264. Smimov, supra note 186.
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cratic reform and promote business growth. It would broaden, instead of
continuing or curtailing, the dialogue over the business-government rela-
tionship by including additional voices in the conversation. Foreign aid
could support conferences involving Russian and American business as-
sociations, Duma and Congressional representatives, prosecutors, politi-
cal consultants, and academics. Rather than relying on U.S. experts as
teachers, this ambitious approach recognizes that all parties, both Ameri-
can and Russian, could learn from a candid consideration of how to best
regulate lobbying.
Lobbyists pervade the business-government relationship. Interna-
tional pressure and the economic price of corruption make regulation of
Russia's undisciplined lobbying a necessity. Duma legislation circulated
in 1995 - the same year Congress passed new lobbying disclosure re-
quirements - failed to export the U.S. model of business-government
ethics to Russia. In 1997, leaders in both countries vowed renewed ef-
forts to combat corruption. Whichever course for the future is pursued,
observation of the continuing Russian effort to regulate lobbying will
lead to a better understanding of the virtues and drawbacks of this inevi-
table business practice in both the United States and Russia.
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